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Abstract
This paper starts from a distinction between “old” and “new” behavioral economics. The former is associated
with, amongst others, a Carnegie group around Herbert Simon and a Michigan cluster led by George Katona.
The roots of the latter may be traced to the work of especially Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Concerning
the former, the paper illustrates how it emerged out of an interest in organizational policy. Regarding the latter,
the paper argues that it serves as a natural input for policy concerning individual decision making. The returning
theme is that behavioral economics serves as inherent inspiration for policy proposals.
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Introduction
Behavioral economics along with its focus on the interrela-
tions between economics and psychology is attracting increas-
ing attention and recognition (Sent, 2004; Heukelom, 2014;
Frantz et al. 2016). There are two reasons for this.
The first is that mainstream economics has evolved. Whe-
reas elegant mathematics had left little to no room for messy
psychology (Camerer, 1999; Laibson and Zeckhauser, 1998;
Mirowski, 2002), new space for psychological insights was
created when mainstream economics encountered mathemati-
cal difficulties, especially in general equilibrium theory. These
facilitated not only the incorporation of psychological insights
overall, but also encouraged efforts to integrate some bounded
rationality in particular into mainstream (Sent, 2004). To
be sure, this did not involve a move completely away from
mathematics.
The second reason for the increased attention and recog-
nition concerns the fact that behavioral economics itself has
evolved as well. That is, a distinction between “old” and
“new” behavioral economics can be made. Old behavioral
economics is associated with, amongst others, a Carnegie
group around Herbert Simon and a Michigan cluster led by
George Katona (Earl 1988). Partly due to its explicit efforts
to distance itself from the mainstream, old behavioral eco-
nomics never caught on in economics “proper”. The roots of
new behavioral economics may be traced to the 1970s and
the work of especially Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
but also Baruch Fischoff, Paul Slovic, and others (Camererer,
1999; Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; 1979; Kahneman, Slovic,
and Tversky, 1982; Laibson and Zeckhauser, 1998; Rabin,
1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1987). Kahneman and Tversky
started from the rationality assumption that has characterized
mainstream economics and next analyzed departures from
this yardstick, as opposed to developing an alternative one.
Indeed, Colin Camerer (1999) noted:
This sort of psychology provided a way to model
bounded rationality which is more like standard
economics than the more radical departure that
Simon had in mind. Much of behavioral eco-
nomics consists of trying to incorporate this kind
of psychology into economics. (p. 5)
Following up on this distinction, the remainder of the pa-
per will first illustrate how old behavioral economics emerged
out of an interest in organizational policy. Next, it will elab-
orate a problem of mainstream economics in addressing in-
dividual economic decision making. This is followed by the
argument that new behavioral economics is a natural input for
such policy. The returning theme is that behavioral economics
serves as an inherent inspiration for policy proposals. Being
of a relatively brief and introductory nature, this paper does
not aim to offer a complete or exhaustive overview of the rich
history of behavioral economics. We do, however, seek to set
most prominent foil, against which to understand discussions
regarding behavioral economic policy making.
Old behavioral economics
and organizational policy
The original purpose of behavioral economics models was to
characterize the effects of a restricted rational agent on the as-
sumptions (and conclusions) of economic and administrative
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theory. These models have significantly influenced, directly
and indirectly, theories of organizations (see Cyert and March,
1963). Organizations are viewed as devices, alternative to the
market, by which individuals acting with incomplete knowl-
edge and information can satisfactorily reduce their uncer-
tainty and take their decisions. At the same time, the bounded
rationality of the members of the organization restricts their
ability to achieve optimality in the pursuit of their goals. As a
result, old behavioral economics sees organizations as setting
targets and looking for alternatives that satisfy those targets,
rather than trying to find the best imaginable solution. The
typical administrator will follow rules-of-thumb to consider
only those solutions that will satisfy reasonable goals with as
few complications as possible. Furthermore, she will attend
to goals sequentially, rather than simultaneously. With their
focus on organizations, these theories and observations on
decision making have been applied to the systems and tech-
niques of planning, budgeting, and control that are used in
designing organizational policy.
Subsequent research has both expanded and distorted
the insights of the early behavioral economics theorists con-
cerning organizational policy. Mainly through Williamson’s
(1975) insistence, the notion of bounded rationality has played
a prominent role in transaction cost economics. Williamson
sought to link the idea of conflict of interest with the idea of in-
formation limitations and saw organizational forms as implicit
or explicit solutions to the problems of decision and control
created by opportunism and bounded rationality. Opportunism
refers to the fact that there is conflict of interest within, as
well as between, organizations, and that participants in an
organization will lie, cheat, and steal in their own self-interest
if they can. Bounded rationality makes complete contracting
infeasible because not everything can be known and there are
limits to the capabilities of decision makers for dealing with
information and anticipating the future. However, Williamson
was reluctant to accept the notion of satisficing, primarily be-
cause he thought it would denote irrational behavior. Thereby,
he made his work more palatable to the mainstream who
might envisage contractual choices in terms of the subjective
utility model. At the same time, Simon himself considered
satisficing to be a direct implication of bounded rationality.
Although Williamson makes bounded rationality a key
issue in relation to potential for market failure, he does not
carefully distinguish between information processing prob-
lems (as with contracts that are too complex to understand or
keep in one’s memory) and founded imagination (failures to
envisage what could go wrong with a transaction, especially if
would be opportunists can think more creatively about devious
ruses to exploit the limits of what is in the contract). While
the former is from Simon’s line of thinking, albeit with the
contrast just elaborated, the latter comes from Shackle’s work
(Earl and Littleboy, 2014). However, while Williamson did re-
fer to Shackle in passing, he never seemed to bring out clearly
these different cognitive sources of contractual problems.
An approach similar in spirit to transaction-cost economics,
but one that gives much smaller weight to limited rationality,
as opposed to conflict, is found in agency theory. As these
ideas have been taking shape, attention to bounded rational-
ity has tended to fade into the background, and attention to
conflict of interest has become paramount. What they share,
however, is a focus on corporate policy.
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary theory of busi-
ness firm growth brought new impulses to behavioral eco-
nomics modeling of organizational policy in economics. It
emphasizes differential survival as a primary basis for chang-
ing populations of firms, and sees firms as being selected upon
by virtue of their fit to the environment. Nelson and Winter
stressed the inability of firms to carry out the necessary calcu-
lations for optimization, because the firm will not ”know” all
the things of which it is capable, because all future contingen-
cies cannot be foreseen, because mistakes can be made, and
so forth. In Nelson and Winter’s view, the notion of satisficing
can account for persistence of routines in their evolutionary
theory. The theory uses two key concepts. The first is the
idea that organizations develop, stabilize, and follow routines.
The second is a conception of search. Differential outcomes
from search result in differential rates of survival and growth
in firms. These differences, in turn, affect the distribution of
activities and interactions at the industry level. The empha-
sis on the historical path by which organizational forms are
achieved found echoes in a number of other developments
such as research on path dependence.
As the preceding discussion has argued, the focus of old
behavioral economics was on organizational policy with little
interest in day-to-day decision making by individuals. At the
same time, especially mainstream macroeconomists desiring
to make policy recommendations starting from the perspective
of individuals encountered serious difficulties, as elaborated
in the next section. In a sense, as subsequently clarified in
section four, this created space for the move of behavioral
economics towards the domain of individual decision making,
parallel to the move from old to new behavioral economics.
Mainstream macroeconomics and
microfounded policy recommendations
The Carnegie group in old behavioral economics also included
John Muth, who introduced the rational expectations hypothe-
sis as an illustration of the rationality implicit in theories of
bounded rationality and of the bounded rationality implicit
in theories of rationality (Sent, 2002). Subsequently, rational
expectations models have been used as a vehicle for mak-
ing recommendations for improving policy decisions starting
from microfoundations (Sent, 1998). The presumption is that
the behavior of private agents is purposeful and optimizing,
while that of government agents is arbitrary. This asymmetry
then leaves scope for suggesting improvements.
Now, making recommendations for improving policy amo-
unts to assuming that in the historical period the system was
not really in a rational expectations equilibrium, having at-
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tributed to agents expectations about government policy that
did not properly take into account policy advice (Sargent,
1984). This is because a rational expectations model during
the estimation period ought to reflect the procedure by which
policy is thought later to be influenced, for agents are posited
to be speculating about government decisions into the indef-
inite future. Moreover, making the assumption that in the
historical period the system was in a rational expectations
equilibrium raises a question of why we study a system that
we cannot influence, for if this procedure is not thought likely
to be a source of persuasive policy recommendations, most
of its appeal vanishes. Indeed, there is a logical difficulty in
using a rational expectations model to give advice, stemming
from the self-referential aspect of the model that threatens
to absorb the economic advisor into the model. That simul-
taneity is the source of logical difficulties in using rational
expectations models to give advice about government policy.
Bounded rationality appears to offer a way out, though.
For why would government agents be smarter than others?
Making government agents just as boundedly rational as the
agents in behavioral economics models may offer an oppor-
tunity for making policy recommendations possible (Sargent,
1993). And this brings us to the next phase, which is the
focus of new behavioral economics on individual behavior (as
opposed to the focus on organizations by old behavioral eco-
nomics). New behavioral economics serves as a natural input
for policies that address individual behavior, as elaborated in
the next section.
New behavioral economics and nudging
individuals
New behavioral economics arose from the work of psycholo-
gists such as, first and foremost, Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky (e.g. Heukelom, 2014; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, Kahneman, 2011). Its prin-
cipal advocate within the economics discipline was Richard
Thaler, a business economist with a PhD from the University
of Rochester. Starting with Thaler’s “Towards a Positive The-
ory of Consumer Choice” (1980), and based on the work of
Kahneman and Tversky, Thaler argued that individuals sys-
tematically and predictably deviate from the rational norms
as assumed and implied by economic theory).
From the start new behavioral economics was partly de-
fined in opposition to the market-oriented experimental eco-
nomics of Vernon Smith, Charlie Plott and others (e.g. Svoren-
cˇı´k and Maas, 2015; Svorencˇı´k, forthcoming). While experi-
mental economists such as Vernon Smith and Charlie Plott in
the 1960s and 1970s set up experiments to design markets that
steer fallible, but self-interested behavior of individuals to an
efficient equilibrium more effectively, behavioral economists
such as Richard Thaler, Colin Camerer, and George Loewen-
stein from the 1980s onwards argued that because individuals
are boundedly rational, no such equilibrium could be obtained.
Even though this position was usually deemphasized for fear
of being accused of producing partisan politics, it was obvious
that behavioral economics worked in a liberal, Democratic
tradition, and experimental economists in a conservative, Re-
publican one (Heukelom, 2012).
The next step new behavioral economists took was to in-
vestigate how they –as experts on individual decision making–
may induce individuals to behave more in accordance with
those rational norms. Yet it was not until the mid 1990s that
this additional line of new behavioral economics began to
emerge. The reason, perhaps, is that the very idea of system-
atic and predictable deviations had to be established in the
first place.
Thaler’s, and thus new behavioral economics’ first policy
program was Saving More Tomorrow (SMarT), a program
that sought to induce (American) employees into saving more
for their retirement by increasing the amount saved with ev-
ery raise in salary, thus avoiding the problem of reducing net
wages when increasing retirement savings. Other examples of
new behavioral economics-inspired attempts to make individ-
uals behave more rational include the E.U.’s ban on pre-ticket
boxes for online purchases, and U.S. fuel economy labels
(Behavioraleconomics.com). Theoretically, this extension of
new behavioral economics into government policy was or-
ganized under the heading of, first, Libertarian Paternalism
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003), and later, more famously, Nudg-
ing (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; also see Waterson, 2004).
It speaks to the influence of this line of research that while
Thaler and Sunstein in the first edition of their book Nudge
in 2008 felt compelled to explain to their partly non-native
audience the meaning of the word “nudge”, by the mid 2010s
nudging had become a household concept and approach in
many areas outside of economics and the English-speaking
world1.
Government policy inspired by new behavioral economics
became institutionalized first with the creation of the Be-
havioural Insights Team (BIT) by British prime minister David
Cameron in 2010. The aim, initially, was in line with new
behavioral economic research of the previous twenty years:
to contrast all British laws and regulations with the empirical
evidence of humans’ boundedly rational psychology. Inspired
by the success of the BIT, similar government policy insti-
tutes were set up in other countries and institutions, including
the U.S. and the E.U. (Time.com, ec.europe.eu). In addition,
research from the mid 2000s onwards by among others Send-
hil Mullainathan, began to emphasize the use of behavioral
economics for understanding questions of development eco-
nomics, and generally of helping the poor, also in developed
countries. (Mullainathan, Bertrand, and Hanna, 2010; Mul-
lainathan and Shafir, 2009). As a result, institutes such as
the World Bank began to employ new behavioral economics
for solving social problems such as poverty, early child de-
velopment and health in developing countries (World Bank,
2015).
1 (e.g. http://www.nudge.nl, http://www.nudgefrance.org/nudgechallenge/,
https://www.dpmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/behavioural-econo-mics; Thaler,
2015).
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Also the economic crisis of recent years gave new impetus
to behavioral economics (Heukelom and Sent, 2010). This is
due to the fact that the onset of the crisis can be traced back to
the bounded rationality of policy makers, thereby resonating
with the lessons drawn from the failure of making policy
recommendations within the rational expectations framework.
For, recall that the previous section concluded that making
government agents just as boundedly rational as the agents in
behavioral economics models may offer an opportunity for
making policy recommendations possible.
In particular, the actions of policy makers were myopic,
focusing on the potential short-term gains, while neglecting
the negative long-term repercussions. Jimmy Carter, Bill Clin-
ton, and George W. Bush and their Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) stimulated subprime mortgages. That is, the CRA
was adopted under Jimmy Carter in 1977 and forced banks to
provide mortgages to risky minority groups. In 1995 this law
was modified under Bill Clinton. Expanded in 2002, George
W. Bush further stimulated the issuing of mortgages for minor-
ity groups so they could live the American Dream. However,
when the circumstances changed, this turned into an American
nightmare for both home owners and banks.
Moreover, under the leadership of Alan Greenspan the
American central bank conducted a far too loose monetary
policy with negative long-term repercussions. In an effort not
to burst the bubble, huge amounts of money were pumped
into the economy. Some of that money eventually made it
to the U.S. subprime market. In his focus on the short run,
the loose money policy seemed like a good idea, but in the
long run the bounded rationality of this effort had devastating
results. Also the Chinese policy makers were myopic in
systematically keeping the value of their currency low. This
created a trade surplus in China, which led to an inflow of large
reserves of U.S. dollars that were subsequently invested in U.S.
treasuries. This kept American interest rates systematically
low, thereby reinforcing the loose monetary policy of the
U.S. central bank. Again, this seemed like a good short-run
strategy, but eventually led to a destruction of the value of the
assets held by China.
In sum, what the policy prescriptions that followed from
new behavioral economics share is a desire to induce, or
nudge, people into acting more in accordance with neoclas-
sical theory. In addition, new behavioral economic policy is
best understood as a set of (liberal) policies that offer ways
to engineer higher social welfare for situations in which the
market partly fails.
Closing comments
The subdiscipline of behavioral economics goes back to the
1950s and 1960s research of, among others, Simon, Cyert, and
March. This “old” behavioral economics deviated from the
behavioral foundations upon which mainstream economics
was based, both as a descriptive and as a normative theory of
economic decision making. Despite Simon’s Nobel Prize in
1978, however, old behavioral economics had only modest
impact on the mainstream of the economics discipline. At
the same time, the “new” behavioral economics that began
to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s initially did not always
appear as attractive as the axiomatized certainties of neoclas-
sical economics. Yet, more and more economists began to
embrace one form or another of bounded rationality from the
2000s onwards. In contrast to old behavioral economics, new
behavioral economists’s models of bounded rationality owe
their revival mostly to attempts to strengthen neoclassical eco-
nomics, be it as a normative theory instead of as a descriptive
one.
Both old and new behavioral economics have been policy
oriented. But while old behavioral economics focused its
research and (occasional) advice mostly on the level of the
organization, new behavioral economics takes the individual
as point of departure –as consumer, employee, voter, or oth-
erwise. For both old and new behavioral economics there
does not appear to be a preferred channel for the behavioral
advice. Reports for governments, popular books, and business
consultations are used depending on the occasion. What these
show is that behavioral economics is a natural input for policy
recommendations.
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